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Communications

(Editor's Note: In an article entitled "Rhodesia and the United
Nations: 'The Lawfulness of International Concern', 62 American
Journal of InternationalLaw" (1968), Professors Myres S. McDougal
and W. Michael Reisman approved United Nations' sanctions against
Rhodesia. Part of the article was reprinted in 2 InternationalLawyer
(July, 1968). In that same issue were published remarks by Dean
Acheson, sharply critical of the position taken by ProfessorsMcDougal
and Reisman. Given hereunderare supplementary remarks by Professor
Charles Burton Marshall, further criticising the McDougal-Reisman
position, and a reply by Messrs. McDougal and Reisman to Professor
Marshall.)

Comment- Marshall
One shred of the debris left by Mr. Acheson's mighty blast
deserves attention.
According to one of the arguments raised by Myres S. McDougal
and W. Michael Reisman in attempting to rationalize sanctions against
Rhodesia, that country's policies "constitute ...at least the creation of
circumstances under which states have been customarily regarded as
justified in unilaterally resorting to the coercive strategies of humanitarian intervention" (62 A.J.I.L. 1, 10-11). The assertion is not
syllogistically developed. A reader is left to guess what the content of
the policies referred to may be. A footnote is vouchsafed concerning
the canons ostensibly invoked. It reads: "6 Moore, International Law
Digest 345-367 (1906); Lauterpacht, International Law and Human
Rights 120 ff. (1950); Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order: The
Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion 83,
footnote 16 (1968)."
Skeptical of the argument but curious to see whether my own
contrary recollections concerning international law might be at fault, I
have taken pains to check the authorities cited. Here is what I found.
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The relevant pages in John Bassett Moore's Digest reproduce some
twenty items of official U.S. correspondence and pronouncements in
the period 1840-1902 related to questions concerning persecutions of
Jews abroad. These items characteristically reflect reluctance to
intercede on behalf of others than U.S. citizens. A typical expression is
that of President Buchanan in 1859:
i have long been convinced that it is neither the right nor the duty
of this government to exercise a moral censorship over the conduct of
other independent governments and to rebuke them for acts which we
may deem arbitrary and unjust towards their own citizens or subjects.
Such a practice would tend to embroil us with all nations. We ourselves
would not permit any foreign power thus to interfere with our
domestic concerns and enter protests against the legislation or the
action of our government towards our own citizens. If such an attempt
were made we should promptly advise such a government in return to
confine themselves to their own affairs and not intermeddle with our
concerns.
The pertinent pages from Hersh Lauterpacht's International Law
and Human Rights contain several philosophic expressions of the
author's aspiring outlook. I cite one for illustration: "The law of
nations, and, we may say, the law of nature, by denying, as their needs
must do, the absolute sovereignty of States, give their imprimatur to
the indestructible sovereignty of man." More to the point, however, is
Lauterpacht's appraisal of the law as it is rather than as it might be:
"Although international law does not at present recognize, apart from
treaty, any fundamental rights of the individual protected by international society as against the State of which he is a national, it does
acknowledge some of the principal fundamental rights of the individual
in one particular sphere, namely, in respect of aliens."
The relevant footnote in B.S. Murty's book contains four
references. I have read them. These are discussed in turn below.
The first Murty reference is to pages 312-3 13 of the 8th edition of
Hall's InternationalLaw. The pages cited discuss piracy and therefore
are not at all germane. (At another place, however, Hall's International
Law calls it " . . . settled that as a general rule a state must be allowed
to work out its internal changes in its own fashion.")
Murty's second reference is to page 312 of L. Oppenheim's
International Law, 8th edition, edited by Lauterpacht. Besides observing that a state can treat its own nationals according to its own
discretion, the relevant page also refers to "a substantial body of
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opinion" to the effect that there are limits to that discretion and that
intervention is legally permissible when a state renders itself guilty of
cruelties. An editor's -footnote says,

"....

possibly, to the extent to

which 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' have become a
persistent feature, partaking of the character of legal obligations of the
Charter ...they may have ceased to be a matter which is essentially

within the domestic jurisdiction of states."
Murty's third reference is to page 242 of Fenwick's International
Law, 3rd edition. The page concerned refers to instances of interpositions against massacres and notes efforts by jurists to develop technical
grounds to justify such interventions in view of the element of
interference in the domestic affairs of the misbehaving states.
Murty's fourth reference is to page 310 of Brierly's Law of
Nations, 5th edition. There Brierly says ". ..it involves a radical

departure from the present basis of international law to maintain that a
state's treatment of its own subjects is, in the absence of any treaty
protection, anything but a domestic matter which it may decide at its
own discretion."
In sum, none of the sources directly or indirectly cited by
McDougal and Reisman vindicates the allegation in support of which it
is invoked. To the contrary, most of the cited sources unequivocally
contravene the allegation. The moral to be drawn is clear. Even on
behalf of a cause deemed righteous, scholars should practice rigor.
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